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Promoting Trademark's Ends
and Means through Online
Contributory Liability
ABSTRACT
Trademark law accomplishes its ultimate end-helping
consumers easily find, distinguish between, and trust products and
services from different brands-through the means of giving
markholders an incentive to develop and cultivate these brands in the
first place. While individual trademark laws should serve these ends
and means, this is not the case with contributory infringement in the
United States as applied to the Internet. First, since the doctrine is
based entirely in common law with little case law specifically
addressing the online context, contributory infringement gives online
service providers (OSPs) little notice as to what types of behaviors
could result in liability, encouraging providers to be over responsive to
markholders to the ultimate detriment of consumers. Second, this
climate of uncertainty could very well discourage innovative startups
with shallow pockets from entering the market. As a result, the public
could be deprived of technologies that help accomplish trademark law's
consumer-oriented goals. Third, recent case law suggests that judges
are putting too much faith in the free market's ability to regulate
trademark on the Internet. This Note recommends a federal statute to
clarify the duties of OSPs in such a way that promotes trademark's
ends and means.
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Trademark's ends and means are straightforward: benefit
consumers by benefiting markholders.1 By giving markholders a
strong monetary incentive to invest in advertising and monitor for
infringement, trademark law makes it possible for consumers to
distinguish between brands, build trust in brands they like, and
quickly find these brands in the marketplace. 2 By protecting the
economic interests of markholders, trademark law advances the
interests of the consuming public.3
While it would stand to reason that trademark laws should
serve these underlying ends and means of trademark theory, this is
not the case with the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement
under US law. First, with no mention of contributory infringement in
the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute,4 the doctrine is based
entirely in common law. Since existing case law does not establish
clear rules for the Internet context,5 contributory infringement
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Parts L.A-B.
4. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006).
5. See infra Part III.A.
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doctrine gives online service providers (OSPs) like search engines,
e-commerce websites, web hosts, and advertising platforms minimal
guidance as to what types of behavior could result in liability.6 This
climate of uncertainty encourages OSPs like Google and eBay to be
over responsive to markholders, who often demand that OSPs take
down legitimate content to the ultimate detriment of consumers.7
Second, unpredictable liability could very well discourage innovative
OSP startups from entering the market. This could deprive the public
of new technologies that could actually help accomplish trademark's
consumer-oriented goals. Third, recent cases suggest that judges and
lawmakers have assumed too much about the invisible hand's ability
to regulate trademark in the absence of clear trademark law de jure.8
Since OSPs are important players in today's marketplace, it is
imperative to have clearly defined contributory trademark
infringement rules that serve trademark's ends and means. This Note
recommends a legislative solution to accomplish this end.
Part I explores how trademark law achieves its central
purposes: promoting consistent product quality and reducing
consumer search costs by incentivizing markholders to police for
infringement. Part II examines how US and European courts have
addressed trademark infringement claims against OSPs. Part III
argues that judicial treatment of OSP trademark infringement has
established a murky precedent that does not optimally serve the
underlying purpose of trademark law. Part IV recommends a federal
statutory solution that would create more certainty for OSPs under
US law, yet would leave room for judicial development.
I. UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK'S ENDS AND MEANS
With the dual effect of preventing consumer confusion and
protecting brand investment, trademark law serves both consumers
and producers.9 Trademark's primary purpose is to help consumers
distinguish between, trust, and find brands.10  Nonetheless,
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786 (2004). As the Supreme Court has articulated, protecting
producer interests is a means to this end: "National protection of trademarks is desirable,
Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by
securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation." Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (emphasis added).
10. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:4 (4th ed. 2011) ("Trademarks fix responsibility. Without marks, a seller's mistakes or low
quality products would be untraceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks create an incentive
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trademark cannot accomplish this purpose without giving
markholders an economic incentive to build and cultivate their brands
in the first place.
A. Trademark's Ends: Promoting Quality and Reducing Search Costs
While courts have often articulated the purpose of trademark
law in terms of what it prevents-consumer confusion-contemporary
scholars explain trademark's goal in terms of what it promotes."
First presented by the renowned law-and-economics scholars Landes
and Posner, the "information" theory of trademark postulates that by
serving "trust" and "linguistic" functions, trademarks promote
consistent product quality and lower consumer search costS. 12
Trademarks serve a trust function by allowing consumers to
associate initially unobservable product qualities-like a beverage's
flavor or a garment's comfort-with identifiable marks.13 This, in
turn, gives sellers interested in repeat business an incentive to
maintain the quality of their products and services. 14 In a world
without trademarks, consumers would have great difficulty
distinguishing between products that appear nearly identical on the
surface.15 For instance, two unbranded bottles of cola may look like
duplicates on the shelf, despite the fact that they differ in flavor.
Absent trademark law, the producers of these colas, Coca-Cola and
Pepsi, would have little incentive to provide a cola with a consistent
flavor, for consumers would not be able to readily distinguish between
the products. 16 Trademark law gives these producers the exclusive
right to use their brand names "Coca-Cola" and "Pepsi," which help
consumers to distinguish between products that would be otherwise
indistinguishable by sight alone.17 This gives Coca-Cola and Pepsi an
incentive to provide consistent quality goods in order to generate
repeat sales.18
to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods."); id. § 2:5 (noting that
trademarks "reduce the buyer's cost of collecting information about products by narrowing the
scope of information into brand segments rather than have the buyer start anew with each single
product").
11. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 9.
12. Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of
Trademarks, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1563.
13. Id. at 1560.
14. Id. at 1557.
15. Id. at 1563.
16. Id. at 1570.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
18. Katz, supra note 12, at 1557.
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Trademarks also serve a linguistic function by allowing sellers
to communicate information more efficiently through "mental
shortcuts," which simplify the purchaser's decision-making process by
reducing search costs. 19 Revisiting the cola example, imagine ordering
a soft drink at a restaurant in a world without trademark. A customer
wanting Coke would have to frame his question by, for instance,
asking for the cola manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia.20 Trademark
allows the same customer to simply ask for Coke without having to
remember any additional information about the product.21 The
linguistic function works together with the trust function to improve
the information available to market participants, thereby serving
trademark's underlying goal of preventing consumer confusion
through encouraging consistent quality and reducing search costs. 2 2
B. Trademark's Means: Enlisting a Markholder Police Force
Since trademarks carry little, if any, inherent meaning, 23
trademark law cannot accomplish its consumer-oriented goals unless
it encourages markholders to build their brands and monitor for
infringement. Only after Coca-Cola invests substantially in sales and
promotion will consumers begin to recognize the "Coke" trademark as
a mental shortcut for the cola produced by Coca-Cola.24 Even if
Coca-Cola invests heavily in brand development, the Coke trademark
will have little practical value as a trust indicator if every soft drink
producer can use it without limit. 2 5 Thus, trademark law forbids other
cola producers from branding their beverages as "Coke." These rights
are not self-enforcing, though; Coca-Cola must actively monitor the
marketplace for infringing uses. 26  To incentivize infringement
19. Id. at 1559.
20. Id. at 1568.
21. Id. at 1567-68.
22. Id. at 1563.
23. If a word does have inherent meaning, it cannot be protected as a trademark unless
it acquires "secondary meaning" in the minds of consumers. E.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983).
24. Cf. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2:30 ("In like manner, it can be argued that the
law should protect trademarks in order to encourage investment in advertising and the good will
it creates. 'The protection of such monopolies in names seems, then, to rest on the social interest
in protecting primarily, not the consumer, but the businessman who has gained a strategic
advantage through building up of good will, against unfair practices by competitors who desire to
poach on this good will.').
25. See Katz, supra note 12, at 1559 (noting that "in order for trademarks or brand
names to perform this economizing function, they must not be duplicated by others").
26. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 31:38 (noting that duty to police for infringement
belongs to the markholder).
2012] 465
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
policing, trademark law provides markholders like Coca-Cola with
substantial equitable and monetary remedies. 27
Consistent with trademark's consumer focus, trademark law
only permits markholders to object to trademark use where there is
potential for consumer confusion.28 Unlike copyrights, trademarks are
not property rights in gross. 29 As such, Coca-Cola does not have the
right to prevent socially beneficial uses of the "Coke" trademark, such
as journalistic criticism or comparative advertising.30 Such trademark
uses, which benefit the consuming public, actually serve the
underlying purposes of trademark law.
C. Promoting Trademark's Ends and Means through the Law
Under the prevailing information theory of trademark, the
litmus test for a trademark rule should be whether the rule promotes
both the trust and linguistic functions of trademark.31 An example of
such a law is the tort of "passing off," where a seller misrepresents its
goods as being those of another.32 For instance, a cola producer
commits the tort of passing off when it misrepresents its beverages as
being Coca-Cola. Passing off frustrates the linguistic function of the
"Coke" trademark by watering down the mark's ability to serve
unequivocally as an indicator of the beverage's source. 33  It also
frustrates the trust function, for if consumers cannot distinguish
genuine Coke from passed-off versions, Coca-Cola will have little
incentive to provide consistent product quality.34  By penalizing
activities that undermine the trust and linguistic functions of
trademark, the tort of passing off is optimally calibrated to the goals of
trademark. 35
In contrast, an example of a rule that serves neither the trust
nor the linguistic function is a prohibition against comparative
advertising. For instance, one such Canadian law provides that "no
person shall use a trade-mark registered by another person in a
manner that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the
27. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2006) (injunctions); id. § 1117(a) (damages).
28. See id. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
29. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:11.
30. Id. § 25:52 (noting that trademark law permits the use of a protected mark in
comparative advertising, so long as the advertisement is truthful and nonconfusing); id. § 27:91
(noting that in trademark law "[ilt is important to create critical breathing space for legitimate
comment and criticism about products and services").
31. Katz, supra note 12, at 1569-70.
32. Id. at 1570.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1570-71.
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goodwill attaching thereto."36  Unlike the tort of passing off,
comparative advertising does not mislead consumers, but rather,
helps consumers understand a product's quality and attributes.37 For
instance, a truthful advertisement claiming that a beverage tastes like
Coke does not lead consumers to believe that the drink is Coke, but
quickly points consumers to an alternative, comparable product. 38
Preventing comparative advertising squelches these potential societal
benefits, thus undermining trademark's trust and linguistic
functions.39
Just as optimal trademark laws should promote the trust and
linguistic functions of trademark, it also follows that the law should
enable, not inhibit, markholder policing efforts. If markholders are
unable to thoroughly monitor for trademark infringement, trademarks
will lose their power to serve unequivocally as an indicator of a
product's source-and consequently, their power to promote consistent
product quality and reduce consumer search costs. 40  As online
contributory infringement doctrine begins to crystallize, it is worth
considering whether the doctrine is evolving into one that will serve
both the ends and means of trademark.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF ONLINE CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT
Unlike in Europe, where most national courts hold OSPs to
varying duties of care, US courts apply a single standard set forth by
the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc.4 1 One would think that the contributory infringement doctrine in
the US would be fairly straightforward, given that a Supreme Court
case defines the relevant test. However, courts have struggled to
determine how to translate Inwood to the Internet context.
36. Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 22(1) (Can.). This is demonstrated acutely
in the Canadian case of Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co. See Katz, supra note
12, at 1576-77 (citing Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co. (1968), 2 Ex. C.R. 552
(Can.)). Defendant Revlon developed a hair dye product similar to that offered by plaintiff
Clairol, then the Canadian market leader. Id. at 1572-73. Revlon placed a color comparison chart
on its product packaging, comparing its own hair dye with shades offered by Clairol. Id. at 1573.
In the chart's column headers appeared Clairol's trademark-protected brand name. Id. Clairol
prevailed against Revlon under s. 221 of the Trade-Marks Act, which prohibits comparative
advertising. Id. at 1573-74.
37. See Katz, supra note 12, at 1575-76.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1568-69.
40. See id. at 1559 (noting that "in order for trademarks or brand names to perform this
economizing function, they must not be duplicated by others").
41. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
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A. The Importance of Contributory Liability in OSP Litigation
While contributory infringement is now the dominant theory in
both the United States and Europe for analyzing OSP liability, cases
from the early days of the Internet considered the full panoply of
liability theories-direct, vicarious, and contributory-often conflating
these theories with one another.42
Holding an OSP directly liable for trademark infringement
requires showing that the OSP itself-not a third-party advertiser or
seller-used a protected trademark in commerce in a manner likely to
cause confusion. 43 This argument has most frequently arisen in
search market litigation, where plaintiffs have claimed that by
auctioning protected trademarks as keyword "triggers," search
engines commit direct trademark infringement. 44 Although direct
infringement claims have survived motions to dismiss in a handful of
search market cases, the emerging consensus seems to be that the
theory of direct infringement is not applicable to search engines. 45
One court recently held that keyword auctioning could not result in a
likelihood of confusion as a matter of law, granting summary
42. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 804.
43. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (providing a cause of
action for any use of trademark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person").
44. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v.
GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006). Holding a search engine liable for direct
trademark infringement depends upon the premise that auctioning a trademark as a keyword
"trigger" constitutes actionable "use." See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (creating liability for any
person who "uses in commerce" a registered trademark); Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 127 (discussing
whether keyword auctioning constitutes "use in commerce"). Advertisers determine where their
advertisements will be displayed by bidding on "trigger" keywords. 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 277. At least in the United States, most major search engines do not prohibit
advertisers from bidding on "trigger" keywords that happen to be trademarks. See Eric Goldman,
Microsoft Adopts Google-Style Trademark Policy for Keyword Advertising, ERICGOLDMAN.ORG
(Feb. 15, 2011), http:/Iblog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/02/microsoft adopt.htm; What is
Google's Trademark Policy for Resellers and Informational Sites?, GOOGLE ADWORDS HELP,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/binlanswer.py?hl=en&answer=145626 (last visited Feb.
25, 2011). Plaintiffs have also brought direct infringement claims against other OSPs like online
marketplaces, though with less success than in search engine cases. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir.) (rejecting plaintiffs direct infringement claim against
eBay), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
45. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540-51 (E.D. Va. 2010);
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 806 ("While the use of a trademark as a keyword may well be a
use in interstate commerce sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, satisfying
this minimal requirement is not the same as proving that the defendants have made trademark
use of the plaintiffs brand.").
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judgment for the defendant OSP.46 The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has reached a similar result, though by reasoning that neither
the auctioning of a keyword nor the hosting of an advertisement
containing a trademark constitutes a "use" by a search engine under
applicable law. 47
OSPs could also be liable as vicarious infringers where there
exists some underlying direct infringement by a third party. 48
Vicarious liability requires that the defendant and infringer have an
actual or apparent partnership, have authority to bind one another in
transactions, or exercise joint control or ownership over the infringing
material. 49 Although a handful of plaintiffs in OSP litigation have
asserted this theory,50 recent case law suggests that these claims may
be without merit since most OSPs are not in a partnership with their
users in the eyes of the law.51
Since courts have gradually rejected the theories of direct and
vicarious liability in OSP litigation, contributory infringement is now
the controlling analytical framework.
B. Online Contributory Infringement in the United States
With no express mention of contributory liability in the
Lanham Act,52 the United States applies a common law test for
contributory liability derived from tort law principles. This test,
which emerged nearly a decade before the advent of the Internet in
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., provides for
contributory liability where a party actively induces infringement or
46. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 542-44.
47. Joined Cases C-236, 237 & 238/08, Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier
SA, Google France v. Viaticum, and Google France v. CNRRH, 2010 E.C.R. 1-02417, 55
("Although it is clear from those factors that the referencing service provider operates 'in the
course of trade' when it permits advertisers to select, as keywords, signs identical with trade
marks, stores those signs and displays its clients' ads on the basis thereof, it does not follow,
however, from those factors that that service provider itself 'uses' those signs within the terms of
Article 5 of Directive 89/104 and Article 9 of Regulation No 40/94.").
48. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th
Cir. 1992).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(concluding that since search engine and third party advertisers exercised joint control of the
appearance of advertisements-and consequently, plaintiffs trademarks within the
advertisements-on the search results page, plaintiff had stated a claim of vicarious
infringement against the search engine).
51. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 550 ("Without evidence that Google's Keyword
Tools or its employees direct or influence advertisers to bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks, Rosetta
Stone has not shown that Google controls the appearance and content of the Sponsored Links
and the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks in those Links.").
52. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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continues to supply a known infringer. 53 In Inwood, the Supreme
Court considered whether manufacturers of generic drugs should be
secondarily liable for the infringing conduct of pharmacies, which
ultimately packaged and sold the drugs in bottles with
trademark-infringing labels. 54 Reversing in favor of defendants, the
Court held that a manufacturer or distributor could only be
secondarily liable if it had intentionally induced another to infringe or
continued to supply a merchant it knew, or had reason to know, was
committing trademark infringement.55 Thus, the Inwood test provides
for liability in the cases of inducement and knowledge.
While Inwood itself did not elaborate on the circumstances
under which a defendant might be charged with constructive
knowledge, 56 subsequent cases held that a defendant who remains
"willfully blind" to infringement and continues to supply infringers
may be liable under Inwood's second prong.57 Willful blindness
requires that an actor "suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to
investigate."58 Merely failing to take precautions cannot equate to
"willful blindness," for a service provider is under no duty to actively
prevent counterfeiting. 59
Though Inwood applies on its face only to manufacturers and
distributors, lower courts extended Inwood's test for secondary
liability to service providers whose landlord status implicated special
tort law duties.60 The Seventh Circuit extended the Inwood test in
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc. to the
operator of a flea market where a vendor was selling counterfeit
t-shirts. 61 Although finding for defendants on the merits, the court
53. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
54. Id. at 844.
55. Id. at 854.
56. Id. (providing for liability in case of "knowledge" without elaborating on meaning of
"knowledge" standard).
57. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. The court rejected Hard Rock's vicarious liability theory, reasoning that
although vicarious copyright liability may lie if "the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities," trademark liability should be
'more narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringement." Id. at 1150; see Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984), superseded by statute, 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (making unlawful the circumvention of technological measures intended to control
access to copyrighted works), as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641
F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009). However, plaintiffs in future online trademark infringement
cases were more successful in keeping vicarious liability claims alive past a motion to dismiss.
See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
60. See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
61. Id.
[Vol. 14:2:461470
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applied the Inwood secondary liability test, reasoning that the
landlord-tenant relationship of the flea market operator and vendor
carried with it special duties in tort, much like the
manufacturer-retailer relationship in Inwood.62 Four years later, the
Ninth Circuit followed suit in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
applying the Inwood test to a swap meet that allowed vendors to sell
counterfeit recordings. 63 Denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court noted that although the swap meet did not supply the infringing
recordings, it supplied the necessary marketplace. 64
Courts faced with contributory trademark infringement claims
against OSPs must first decide whether Inwood should apply in the
first place.65 Most courts in the United States have followed the Ninth
Circuit's formulation in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc.6 6 which holds that Inwood applies to an OSP if the OSP exercises
sufficient control over the infringing conduct.67 If the OSP merely
performs a passive "routing service" as with domain registrars, which
link domain names to the IP addresses of web hosting servers, 68 the
OSP is immune from contributory infringement claims.69 OSPs such
62. Id.
63. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. Id.
65. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.
1999).
66. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Size, Inc. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Va. 2003).
67. Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984. ("Hard Rock and Fonovisa teach us that when
measuring and weighing a fact pattern in the contributory infringement context without the
convenient 'product' mold dealt with in Inwood Lab., we consider the extent of control exercised
by the defendant over the third party's means of infringement.").
68. Every hosting server is assigned a unique numerical identifier called an Internet
protocol address (IP address). From Registering a Domain Name to Getting it Online,
WEBHOSTINGINFoTIPs.COM, http://www.webhostinginfotips.com/web-hosting/from-registering-a-
domain-to-getting-it-online.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). Although websites can be accessed
directly by IP address, these numbers are cumbersome to type and difficult to remember. Id.
Registrars sell domain names, a much friendlier alternative to IP addresses for accessing
websites. Id. When an Internet user accesses a domain name, the registrar forwards the user to
the corresponding hosting server. Id.
69. Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984-85. In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., a California district court declined to extend Inwood to domain registrars. 985 F.
Supp. 949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). Unlike the flea market
operator in Hard Roch, who directly controlled and monitored the premises, a registrar could not
reasonably be expected to monitor websites operated by its clients. Id. at 962. The court carefully
distinguished a registrar from a web host, "whose computers provide the actual storage and
communications for infringing material, and who therefore might be more accurately compared
to the flea market vendors in Fonovisa and Hard Rock." Id. Although the Lockheed decision
predated the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006), decisions
postdating the Act still exonerated registrars. See Size, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (characterizing a
domain registrar as a "neutral stakeholder" and "passive messenger service" more like the postal
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as payment processors, who do not exercise "direct" control over the
means of infringement, are immune from liability; for although
cutting off an infringer's line of credit might have the practical effect
of eliminating the infringing conduct, the infringing activity could
theoretically continue without the involvement of the payment
processor.70 If, however, the OSP does exercise significant control over
the means of infringement, Inwood will apply.71 Hosting providers,
search engines, and online marketplaces are examples of OSPs that
fall within the ambit of the Inwood test, for each of these types of OSP
has the ability to cut off the means of infringement. 72
If Inwood applies, the inquiry shifts to whether the OSP
induced infringement or continued to provide its services to a
customer who it actually or constructively knew was infringing.
Existing cases suggest that proving-even alleging-that an OSP
intentionally induced infringement is a tall order. 73 For instance,
courts have uniformly held that even keyword suggestion tools-which
most search engines use to recommend new keywords for advertising
campaigns based on advertisers' site content-are not evidence of
inducement. 74 Sometimes these tools recommend that an advertiser
use a competitor's trademark as a keyword.75 Even where this occurs,
courts have held that there is no inducement, for the recommendation
is purely algorithmic, and the ultimate decision as to whether to use
the word in the campaign lies with the advertiser.76
Knowledge-actual or constructive-is also difficult to prove,
because OSPs cannot be held liable for generalized knowledge of
infringing activity.77  An OSP must have specific knowledge of
identified instances of infringement to be subject to liability,7 8 as
service providers do not have an affirmative duty to actively prevent
service than "the more interactive role of a flea-market operator who has a significant degree of
control" over its clients activities).
70. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2007).
71. See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984.
72. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.) (e-commerce websites),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (hosting providers); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d
700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (search engines).
73. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
74. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("The
mere existence of a tool that assists advertisers in optimizing their advertisements does not, in
itself, indicate intent to induce infringement." (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986))); see also Rescuecom Corp v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009).
75. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 547-49.
76. See, e.g., id. at 536-37.
77. See eBay, 600 F.3d at 109.
78. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
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trademark infringement.79 The fact that an OSP knows its users
could potentially be committing trademark infringement via its service
is not enough for liability to hold.80 Showing "willful blindness" is also
difficult, for failing to take precautions is not a sufficient basis for a
finding of willful blindness.81
C. A Comparison: Contributory Trademark Infringement in Europe
Examining the European approach to contributory
infringement reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the US regime,
for the two differ substantially in their categorization of OSPs and the
level of liability they impose on each type of OSP.
Unlike in the United States, where a uniform standard of
liability applies to any OSP that passes the "sufficient control" test,82
OSP contributory liability in Europe generally depends on whether an
OSP is a "broker" or a passive "host" service.8 3 Whereas passive hosts
are eligible for safe harbor under the European E-commerce
Directive-conditioned primarily upon expeditiously removing
infringing material-brokers are not, and have a legal duty to take
adequate steps to prevent infringement. 84 Though the safe harbor
appears to draw a bright line defining eligibility for protection,
European nations differ in their classification of various types of
OSPs. 85
France takes the position that online marketplaces like eBay
are "brokers" with greater responsibilities than a mere host.86
79. Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 985. Nor can OSPs be held liable for general
knowledge of infringement under a theory of vicarious liability. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp.
v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992). The court rejected Hard Rock's
vicarious liability theory, reasoning that although vicarious copyright liability may lie if "the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in
such activities," trademark liability should be "more narrowly drawn than secondary liability for
copyright infringement." Id. However, plaintiffs in future online trademark infringement cases
were more successful in keeping vicarious liability claims alive past a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss on
plaintiff's vicarious trademark infringement claim against Google).
80. See eBay, 600 F.3d at 109.
81. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.
82. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Brandon Peene, Comment, Lux for Less: EBay's Liability to Luxury
Brands for the Sale of Counterfeit Goods, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1077, 1087-89 (2010).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1096-99.
86. A French court in Hermes International v. eBay, held eBay liable as a broker for
trademark infringement resulting from counterfeiters, resting its reasoning on the fact that eBay
did not have adequate measures in place to detect and guard against infringement. Peene, supra
note 83, at 1096-97; see also Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction], Troyes, June 4, 2008, Docket No. 06/02604 [Hermes Int'l v. eBayl. Similarly, in
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Germany's position, similar to France's, is that eBay is more than a
host entitled to lessened liability.87 In contrast, other nations like
Belgium and the United Kingdom have held that eBay is a passive
hosting service under applicable law, and does not have a general
monitoring obligation with respect to its listings.88
Though European nations have also differed in their
classification of search engines as "broker" or "passive host," the ECJ
recently suggested in Google v. Louis Vuitton that search engines are
"passive hosts" immune from secondary liability.89  A search engine
that does not play an "active role" in the development of the
advertisement in question cannot be secondarily liable "unless, having
obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature . .. of that advertiser's
activities, it failed to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the data concerned." 90 The ECJ's position may guide various national
courts toward a uniform approach-that search engines are "passive
hosts."
To summarize, both the United States and Europe have
gradually adopted contributory trademark infringement, as opposed to
direct or vicarious infringement, as the primary theory for analyzing
OSP liability. Whereas most European countries hold OSPs to
varying duties of care, US courts apply one standard-inducement
and knowledge-to any OSP that falls within the Ninth Circuit's
"substantial control" parameter.91 This singular standard promotes a
degree of uniformity among US courts that is lacking in Europe;
unfortunately, confusion remains as to how exactly this theory should
be applied in practice.
Louis Vuitton v. eBay, the court held eBay liable for trademark infringement related to
counterfeiting on account of insufficient safeguards. Peene, supra note 83, at 1086-96 (citing
Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [Commercial court of Paris], June 30, 2008, Gen. Docket No.
2006077799).
87. Peene, supra note 83, at 1097. The German Federal Supreme Court found eBay
secondarily liable for the sale of counterfeit Rolex watches on the eBay Germany website,
reasoning that eBay failed to take reasonable steps to prevent recurring counterfeit sales after
being notified of specific instances of infringement. Id.
88. Id. at 1100. The United Kingdom High Court, observing that eBay "[took] active
steps to prevent or at least minimise [counterfeit] activities," was not secondarily liable for
trademark infringement. Id. at 1098 (quoting L'Oreal S.A. v. eBay International A.G., [2009]
EWHC (Ch.) 1094, [377], [2009] R.P.C. 21 (Eng.)). "The fact that it would be possible for eBay
Europe to do more does not necessarily mean that it is legally obliged to do more," the court
noted. L'Oreal S.A. v. eBay International A.G., [2009] EWHC (Ch.) 1094, [2771, [2009] R.P.C. 21
(Eng.).
89. See Joined Cases C-236, 237 & 238/08, Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, Google France v. Viaticum, and Google France v. CNRRH, 2010 E.C.R. 1-02417, 11
114-20.
90. Id. 1 120.
91. See supra Part II.C.
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III. HOW THE US REGIME FAILS TO PROMOTE TRADEMARK'S ENDS AND
MEANS
As discussed earlier, optimal trademark rules will serve both
the ends of trademark-promoting consistent quality and reducing
search costs-and the means-enabling markholders to police their
rights. 92 Since search engines do not have a duty to actively monitor
for infringement under US law, 93 search engines have maintained
more liberal trademark policies in the United States than in Europe.94
In contrast, until the recent ECJ decision in Google v. Louis Vuitton, 95
advertisers in continental Europe could not make fair uses9 6 of
trademarks in their advertisements, nor could they use trademarks as
keyword "triggers" in their advertisements. 9 7 This is because many
countries had considered search engines to be "brokers" subject to
heightened duties of care and investigation. 9 8 As OSP policies that
permit fair uses serve the linguistic function of trademark, any reform
to contributory infringement liability should seek to preserve this
effect.
Although the US regime has prompted OSPs to adopt more
lenient trademark policies, thereby freeing up legitimate mark uses
and helping to reduce consumer search costs, it has also produced
several results that are contrary to the ends and means of trademark.
First, under Inwood there are no clear standards for when an OSP
92. See supra Part I.C.
93. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (imposing duty to
stop supplying a customer once the OSP knows, or should know, of infringement). Search engines
also have a duty under Inwood to refrain from inducement, though as discussed earlier, this duty
has little practical meaning. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
94. For instance, Google allows advertisers in Ireland, Canada, the US, and the UK, to
use trademarks in advertisement text where the use is generic, descriptive, or nominative. See
What is Google's Trademark Policy for Resellers and Informational Sites?, GOOGLE ADWORDS
HELP, http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/binlanswer.py?hl=en&answer=145626 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2011).
95. See supra note 72.
96. US trademark law permits a party to make "fair use" of another's trademark in
comparative advertising where: (1) use of the mark is necessary to describe one's product or
service, (2) only so much of the mark is used as is necessary, and (3) the party's use accurately
reflects the relationship between the party's and the markholder's products or services. 6
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 31:156.50.
97. Scott Pickett, Google Set to Change its Trademark Policy Throughout Canada and




98. See generally Peene, supra note 83.
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should be charged with knowledge of infringement.99 This may lead
OSPs to be over responsive to markholder takedown demands, which
is particularly concerning since the underlying purpose of trademark
law-helping consumers easily connect with goods and services they
desire-is not well-served by a notice-and-takedown framework.
Second, the recent Tiffany v. eBay decision 00 may be interpreted as
requiring OSPs to implement multi-million dollar anti-infringement
programs. Such an interpretation may discourage new start-up OSPs
from entering the market, potentially depriving the public of new
consumer-oriented technologies-like Google search, or Amazon's
product suggestion feature-that could actually help to accomplish
trademark's goals. Third, recent cases justify the state of Inwood
jurisprudence with unfounded assumptions about the free market. 101
A. Unclear Common Law Notice-and-Takedown Regime that
Encourages Abusive Takedown Demands
As discussed earlier, Inwood and its progeny seem to impose a
duty on service providers to expeditiously remove content upon actual
or constructive knowledge of infringement. 10 2 The Inwood line of cases
does not define the types of notices from trademark owners that might
count as knowledge of infringement.1 0 3 By contrast, in the copyright
context, the meaning of "knowledge" is clear: A notice of infringement
from a copyright owner counts as "knowledge" under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor so long as the notice is
sent to the OSP's designated agent and meets a number of statutory
criteria, including a statement of good faith under penalty of
perjury. 104 Further, recent case law suggests that copyright owners
must consider fair use before sending a takedown notice.105 Only
notices that satisfy the DMCA's requirements count as "knowledge."10 6
99. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (providing for liability in
case of "knowledge" without elaborating on meaning of "knowledge" standard).
100. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010).
101. See, e.g., eBay, 600 F.3d at 93; Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d
531, 540-51 (E.D. Va. 2010).
102. See supra Part I.B; see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854
(1982).
103. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
647 (2010); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).
104. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006) (enumerating
conditions of copyright notice-and-takedown safe harbor).
105. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) ("[A] notification from a copyright owner or from a person
authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to comply substantially with the
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Absent a statutory notice-and-takedown scheme for trademark, what
criteria must a notice meet to count as "knowledge" under Inwood?
A recent US District Court for the Northern District of
California case, Louis Vuitton v. Akanoc Solutions, illustrates the
problem of Inwood's ambiguous knowledge requirement.107 Plaintiff
Louis Vuitton, a French fashion design corporation, had sent several
notices to defendant Akanoc, a web hosting provider, that it was
hosting numerous websites dedicated to selling counterfeit Louis
Vuitton merchandise. 08  The notices claimed that a private
investigator had determined that goods sold on the suspected websites
were indeed counterfeits. 109 In response, Akanoc did not take down all
of the alleged infringing content, but rather, forwarded the notices
along to the alleged infringers.110 Louis Vuitton claimed that Akanoc's
failure to remove infringing content constituted contributory
trademark infringement under Inwood."' Akanoc moved for
summary judgment, arguing that its system of forwarding notice onto
potential infringers was the only practical way to deal with
infringement claims, given the large number of complaints it received
and its inability to determine what material was actually infringing.112
The court denied Akanoc's motion on the grounds that there
were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Akanoc had
actual or constructive knowledge of infringement on its servers.113
Applying what it referred to as the Ninth Circuit's "less restrictive"
version of the Inwood test for service providers-the "sufficient" test
outlined in Lockheed-the court noted that Akanoc had the ability to
control infringing websites by disabling individual IP addresses or
unplugging entire servers.114  Rejecting Akanoc's argument that
Inwood did not require host providers to "monitor the Internet" for
trademark infringement, the court reasoned that a web hosting
service is not analogous to a "rote translation service" like a
registrar.115 According to the court, hosts are more like the Fonovisa
flea market operator," 6 for hosting websites and routing traffic to and
provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining
whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.").
107. Akanoc, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098.
108. Id. at 1103.
109. Id. at 1105.
110. Id. at 1107.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1106-07.
113. Id. at 1112.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
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from servers "is the Internet equivalent of leasing real estate." 17
Therefore, a host cannot remain "willfully blind" to infringement
occurring on its servers.118 By failing to remove content upon notice,
Akanoc had been willfully blind.119
Ultimately, the Akanoc case resulted in a $32 million jury
verdict in favor of Louis Vuitton.12 0 This suggests that Akanoc's
decision not to rely on the notices sent by Louis Vuitton is what
resulted in liability, even though Akanoc did take some action by
forwarding notice onto the site owner.1 2 1 Akanoc provides no clear
guidelines for what a web host must regard as reliable evidence of
infringement; instead, it leaves many questions. Must OSPs
designate an agent to field notices of trademark infringement? Must
the notice be signed under penalty of perjury? Must a counterfeit
identification expert certify the finding of infringement? Must the
notice contain a statement of good faith? Must it list reasons why fair
use does not apply? These unanswered questions leave the door open
for overzealous trademark owners to pressure OSPs into removing
content to avoid multi-million dollar jury verdicts like that imposed
upon Akanoc. 122 At least two post-Akanoc lawsuits ended in large
verdicts against OSPs for contributory trademark infringement. 123
OSPs have good reason to fear liability as a secondary infringer for
failing to implement this common law notice-and-takedown regime,
the parameters of which are far from clear.124
117. Akanoc, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Eric Goldman, Another Bad Ruling in Louis Vuitton v. Akanoc, ERIcGOLDMAN.ORG
(Mar. 20, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/another-bad-rul.htm.
121. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1107 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that web host forwarded plaintiffs complaints onto suspected
infringers).
122. As discussed above, this is particularly problematic in the trademark context, where
it is arguably even more difficult than in copyright for an OSP to determine fair use. See supra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Order, Tory Burch LLC v.
Yong Sheng Int'l Trade Co., No. 1:10-cv-09336-DAB (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011) (imposing $4
million judgment against each defendant website operator); Judgment, Roger Cleveland Golf Co.
v. Price, No. 2:09-2119-MB (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2011) (imposing $770,750 judgment against
defendant web host).
124. See Eric Goldman, SEOIWeb Design Consultant Faces Contributory Trademark
Liability for "Copycat" E-Commerce Site--Roger Cleveland Golf v. Price, ERICGOLDMAN.ORG (Dec.
10, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/12/seoweb-designc.htm; Owen J. McKeon,
District Court Awards Tory Burch $164 Million in Anti-Counterfeiting Litigation, GIBBONS P.C.:




B. Inhibiting Market Entry for Innovative OSP Startups
Although Inwood and its early progeny did not require OSPs to
"monitor the Internet" for infringement, 12 5 the seminal case of Tiffany
v. eBayl 26 may persuade courts to punish OSPs that do not implement
state-of-the-art systems to combat infringement. In eBay, high-end
retailer Tiffany sued the popular online auction website eBay for
contributory trademark infringement related to a flood of counterfeit
Tiffany products on eBay. 127 Tiffany had repeatedly notified eBay of
counterfeit activity through eBay's Verified Online Resellers Program
("VeRO"), an eBay program that allows trademark holders to notify
eBay of counterfeiting. 1 2 8 In addition to suspending sellers when it
received VeRO notices, eBay had also taken proactive measures to
combat infringement, investing millions of dollars in its "fraud
engine."129  Despite these efforts, counterfeit Tiffany products
continued to appear on eBay. 130 Tiffany brought suit, arguing that
eBay's general knowledge of rampant infringement rendered eBay
liable as a contributory infringer for continuing to supply known
infringers or, alternatively, for remaining willfully blind to infringing
activity.131
The Second Circuit quickly dismissed the possibility of liability
for continuing to supply known infringers, observing that eBay had
expeditiously removed listings from its site each time Tiffany
submitted a VeRO notice. 132  However, the court discussed the
possibility of willful blindness, articulating what one scholar termed a
"new and troublesome legal standard":133
A service provider is not, we think, permitted willful blindness. When it has reason to
suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself
from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.
1 3 4
125. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 (C.D. Cal.
1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
126. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010).
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 106.
129. Id. at 98.
130. Id. at 109 (noting that counterfeit activity continued).
131. Id. at 106.
132. Id. at 109.
133. Eric Goldman, eBay Mostly Beats Tiffany in the Second Circuit, but False
Advertising Claims Remanded, ERICGOLDMAN.ORG (Apr. 1, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2010/04/ebay-mostly bea.htm.
134. eBay, 600 F.3d at 109-10.
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The court held that eBay had not been willfully blind, but it did not
explain its seemingly new terms of art.135 What does it mean for an
OSP to have "reason to suspect" infringement? 1 36 And assuming an
OSP has "reason to suspect" infringement, what must it do to avoid
"shielding itself' from learning of the infringement? Unfortunately,
the Second Circuit left these questions largely unanswered, offering
little analysis for why eBay was not guilty of intentionally shielding
itself from learning of infringement. 137
The only justification the court stated outright was that eBay
"spent millions of dollars" in developing its VeRO program. 138 Does
this mean that other OSPs must follow suit in implementing
expensive infringement detection programs in order to avoid liability?
This possible interpretation of the eBay opinion may deter innovative
OSP startups with shallow pockets from entering the market. While
the actual costs of preventing innovation are unquantifiable, the
potential costs to society are great: How different would our modern
marketplace be without Google's search technology, eBay's
e-commerce business model, or Amazon's product suggestion feature?
Hampering technological innovation that could help consumers
connect with products and services undermines trademark's goal of
reducing consumer search costs. While the Second Circuit's opinion is
not technically binding across the country, courts in other circuits
have already chosen to apply eBay.13 9 Considering that the Supreme
Court denied Tiffany's petition for certiorari, 140 eBay will likely remain
de facto controlling precedent unless legislators intervene.
C. Unfounded Reliance on the Free Market to Regulate Trademark
Recently, some courts and commentators have expressed a
belief that market forces provide OSPs with enough incentives to
regulate trademark. 141 They reason that consumer complaints about
counterfeit products and misleading advertisements will sufficiently
135. Id. at 109.




139. See Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., No. 10-CV-141-LM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62317, at
*24-27 (D.N.H. June 9, 2011).
140. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (denying the petition for writ of
certiorari from 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)).
141. See eBay, 600 F.3d at 109; Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531,
548 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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persuade OSPs to create their own "home-brewed" trademark law. 142
It may be true that, in the absence of legal obligations, OSPs still
choose to regulate trademark to some extent. Yet there is no
guarantee that this home-brewed trademark law will adequately serve
the underlying ends and means of trademark law at large, as
evidenced by an example in the search engine marketing context
discussed below.
1. The Cases: Tiffany v. eBay and Rosetta Stone v. Google
The first case to express its confidence in the market's ability to
check trademark infringement was Tiffany v. eBay, discussed above. 143
In holding that eBay had not been willfully blind to counterfeiting
activities, the Second Circuit emphasized that eBay had strong
market incentives to battle infringement:
[W]e are also disposed to think, and the record suggests, that private market forces give
eBay and those operating similar businesses a strong incentive to minimize the
counterfeit goods sold on their websites. eBay received many complaints from users
claiming to have been duped into buying counterfeit Tiffany products sold on eBay. The
risk of alienating these users gives eBay a reason to identify and remove counterfeit
listings. Indeed, it has spent millions of dollars in that effort.
1 44
Although the court's holding did not hinge upon its assumptions about
the marketplace, it seems that the court felt more comfortable
exonerating eBay after convincing itself that the free market would
serve as an adequate substitute for regulation de jure.145
Two years after eBay, the US District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia adopted a similar line of reasoning in Rosetta
Stone v. Google, granting summary judgment in favor of Google on a
claim of contributory trademark infringement. 14 6 Rosetta Stone, a
producer of language-learning computer software, alleged that third
party advertisers had infringed its trademarks in keyword "trigger"
bids and advertisement text. 147  Google, it argued, should be
secondarily liable under Inwood for these infringements. 148 The court
held that, although Inwood did indeed apply, Google could not be
142. Greg Lastowka, Tiffany v. eBay (2d Cir. 2010), MADISONIANNET (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://madisonian.net/2010/04/01/tiffany-v-ebay-2d-cir-2010 (noting that the Second Circuit in
eBay "suggests that as a private company, eBay has market-based motivations to create and
enforce it's [sic] own home-brewed blend of trademark law in response to the demands of
consumers, within its own little auction jurisdiction").
143. eBay, 600 F.3d at 109.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
147. Id. at 535.
148. Id.
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found liable under either the inducement or knowledge prong. 14 9
There was no evidence that Google intended to induce infringement by
a third party.150 Neither the existence of a keyword suggestion tool
nor profit motive, the court asserted, was evidence of intent to
contribute to infringement. 15 1 Further, there was no proof that Google
continued to supply customers whom it had reason to know were
committing trademark infringement, for it responded to takedown
requests and had a team dedicated to combating infringement. 1 5 2 To
bolster its argument, the court reasoned that market forces provided
Google ample incentive to combat trademark infringement, noting
that advertisements for counterfeit goods "can create a bad experience
for web users, who Google ultimately relies on for its business." 153 "It
would run counter to good business practice for Google to encourage
and provide advertising space to those it knows are infringing on the
Rosetta Stone Marks," the court opined. 154
Although the market incentives theory postulated by the eBay
and Rosetta Stone courts is not outlandish, it is far from a foregone
conclusion that OSPs have sufficient market incentives to produce the
kind of trademark policies that will promote the underlying goals of
trademark law.
2. An Example: Search Engine Marketing and Mark Policing
The fact that "home-brewed" trademark law may not
adequately serve the ends and means of trademark manifests itself
clearly in the search engine advertising context. Search engines do
not provide markholders with any infringement policing tools beyond
the ordinary search feature. 155 Nonetheless, since the sponsored links
on the search results page are tailored to a user's search, sometimes a
markholder will be able to find infringing listings by performing a
simple search. 15 6  Unfortunately, even though this technique is
potentially the best method of policing available, it will not give the
markholder an accurate understanding of whether other advertisers
149. Id. at 546-49.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 547-48.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 548.
154. Id.
155. See What is Google's Trademark Policy for Resellers and Informational Sites?,
ADWORDS HELP (Sept. 30, 2011), http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&
answer=145626 (explaining how trademark owners may submit notices of suspected
infringement, but failing to mention any specialized tool for detecting infringement).
156. See Sponsored Links, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/support/places/binlanswer.
py?hl=en&answer=31662 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
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are infringing her mark due to the numerous filters and targeting
mechanisms available to advertisers in search engine marketing.
One problem scenario involves the "broad match" feature,
which allows an advertiser to display an advertisement whenever
someone searches for a broad universe of terms. 15 7 For example, if
Pepsi wanted to display an advertisement when users performed
searches related to the word "cola," it could "key" its advertisement to
"cola" on broad match. Its advertisement could appear to users
searching for any number of phrases containing "cola," such as "pepsi
cola," "cherry cola," and "diet cola." If Coca-Cola searched for its
trademark "coca cola," it too might see the Pepsi advertisement, even
though Pepsi had not specifically intended to "key" its advertisement
to "coca cola."15 8 Coca-Cola would not be able to tell the difference,
though, because search results pages do not distinguish between
advertisements based on the match type chosen. This could result in
markholders filing complaints, only to learn in pretrial discovery that
the defendant had not "keyed" its advertisement to the plaintiffs
trademark. An additional issue is that advertisers can-and often
do-apply numerous filters to their advertisement campaigns that
cause their advertisements to be displayed only in certain locales
around the world, or only at certain times of day.159 Without jumping
through technological hoops, a trademark holder located in Tennessee
policing for infringement would not find an infringing advertisement
targeted to residents of Florida. 160  Thus, a markholder could
potentially never find infringing advertisements, despite having
performed a reasonably diligent search, simply by being at the wrong
157. What are Keyword Matching Options?, GOOGLE ADWORDs HELP, http:/ladwords.
google.com/support/awlbin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6100 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
158. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1173 (D. Utah
2010) (noting that "[o]ne cannot tell from a screen shot alone what keyword generated the
sponsored link"). Since it is still an open question whether "keying" an advertisement to a
trademarked term could constitute trademark infringement, this issue may continue to find its
way into court as it did recently in another case brought by repeat plaintiff 1-800 Contacts. See
Rachel R. Friedman, Note, No Confusion Here: Proposing a New Paradigm for the Litigation of
Keyword Advertising Trademark Infringement Cases, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 355, 360
(2010) (noting circuit split regarding whether auctioning of trademarks as keyword "triggers"
constitutes "use" in commerce).
159. See, e.g., Ad Scheduling, GOOGLE ADWORDS HELP, http://adwords.google.com/
support/aw/binlanswer.py?hl=en&answer=117585 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); Location
Targeting, GOOGLE ADWORDS HELP, http://adwords.google.com/support/awlbinlanswer.py?hl=
en&answer=6317 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) ("That campaign's ads will appear only to users
located in those areas and who have selected one of those languages as their preference.").
160. Users can circumvent regional restrictions through proxy servers. Nik Cubrilovic,
On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're Not in the USA, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 5, 2009), http://
techcrunch.com/2009/10/05/internet-anonymizer-web-surf-vpn-hulu-pandora-spotify. However, it
is not reasonable to expect the average trademark holder to be able to leverage this technology,
or to even know that it exists.
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place at the wrong time. 161 This undermines the means of trademark:
enabling markholders to effectively monitor for infringement.
Although prohibiting a markholder from effectively policing for
infringement works contrary to the ends and means of trademark,
Inwood does not address this problem. Under Inwood, OSPs have two
responsibilities: to refrain from inducing infringement, and to take
down infringing content upon notice. 162 With no legal impetus for
aiding a markholder in monitoring for infringement, OSPs are left to
market incentives, which, as discussed above, and as seen empirically,
are not enough. This is not to suggest that the law should require
service providers to make infringement monitoring as easy as possible.
OSPs should not have to expend extra effort streamlining the
monitoring process. Rather, the concern is when OSPs encumber the
policing process with technological barriers that prevent even the
most diligent markholders from discovering infringement.
In conclusion, the current state of contributory trademark
infringement law in the United States undermines the ends and
means of trademark in three ways: (1) it creates a high level of
uncertainty about what types of takedown notices could impute
knowledge to an OSP, and thus, result in liability, which encourages
OSPs to overreact to potentially abusive takedown notices; 163 (2) it
may discourage new OSP startups from entering the market,
potentially depriving the public of consumer-oriented technologies; 16 4
and (3) it relies in vain on the free market to fill in the gaps that
Inwood does not reach. 165 With the Internet being arguably the most
important distribution outlet in modern day commerce, it is
imperative that there be clearly defined contributory trademark
infringement rules that serve trademark's trust and linguistic
functions and enable markholders to effectively monitor for
infringement.
IV. PROMOTING TRADEMARK'S ENDS AND MEANS: LEGISLATING
CLARITY AND GOOD INCENTIVES
A glance at the history of litigation between trademark owners
and OSPs suggests that leaving contributory infringement entirely to
the courts may not be a viable solution. Settling out of court has
proven to be a more economical strategy in many of these cases, and
161. Id.
162. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
163. See supra Part III.A.
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. See supra Part III.C.
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for that reason the common law has many unfilled gaps.166 That being
said, history has also proven that Congress can be overreactive in
legislating for the Internet, hastily passing laws without first
gathering enough wisdom from experience. 167 An optimal approach to
shaping the doctrine of contributory infringement with respect to
OSPs would be a federal statute defining a clear legislative safe
harbor that leaves ample room for future judicial interpretation and
development. Specifically, such a statute should: (1) broadly identify
categories of OSPs that could be subject to contributory liability, (2)
clarify how OSPs must respond to infringement notices, and (3)
establish OSP-specific safe harbor conditions that will serve the ends
and means of trademark.
A. Categorizing OSPs
A contributory liability statute should first identify categories
of OSPs that are subject to contributory liability. These categories
must be broad enough to accommodate technologies and business
models not yet developed, yet specific enough to promote consistent
interpretation among courts.
The European classification of OSPs as "brokers" and "passive
hosts" is weak, for these terms have been susceptible to varying
interpretations by different national courts. 168 This results in one
country holding an OSP to minimal takedown obligations and another
country requiring heightened investigatory duties. 169 Recreating such
a system in the United States could result in conflicting OSP
obligations from circuit to circuit.
Copyright law provides a good model for categorizing OSPs.
The DMCA's safe harbor provision places OSPs into four categories:
(1) transitory communications (like Internet service providers), (2)
system caching (like when an Internet service provider keeps a local
copy of a website on its servers), (3) storage of materials at the
direction of a user (like hosting services and commerce portals), and
(4) information location tools (like search engines). 170  These
166. E.g., Eric Goldman, American Airlines and Google Settle Keyword Advertising
Lawsuit, ERIcGOLDMAN.ORG (July 19, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/
american airlin_1.htm; Google Settles Last Part of Geico Trademark Case, MSNBC (Sept. 7,
2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9247020/ns/business-consumer news.
167. See generally Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law
in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309 (2002) (discussing the dangers inherent in over-hasty
congressional action related to new technologies).
168. See supra Part III.B.
169. Id.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2006).
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classifications are much less ambiguous than their European
counterparts, yet leave some flexibility for judicial interpretation.
However, the DMCA's OSP classifications would need some
reworking for the trademark context. For instance, hosts and
e-commerce websites fall under the same DMCA classification. 171 This
makes sense in the copyright context, where OSPs like eBay, are in
many ways, essentially acting as hosts for the purposes of copyrighted
material-that is, the photos and textual descriptions of the items
being sold. 172 In contrast, hosts and e-commerce websites intersect
with trademark very differently. Whereas these two types of OSPs
may both facilitate the display of trademarks on the Internet, e-
commerce websites also facilitate the sale of potentially counterfeit
goods. 173 This difference is at least partially reflected in the European
system, where some countries consider e-commerce websites to be
"brokers" rather than "passive hosts." 17 4 Further, some of the DMCA
categories, "transitory communications" and "system caching," capture
OSPs that have not, and should not, be subject to contributory
trademark infringement liability.175 Finally, the DMCA category,
"information location tools" fails to distinguish between paid and
organic search listing services, a distinction that matters in the
context of trademark. With paid listings, a search engine contracts
with a finite number of advertisers, increasing the likelihood that it
may have knowledge of infringement.1 7 6 It also makes suggestions to
advertisers regarding how to optimize their campaigns, strengthening
the case for inducement.177 In contrast, a search engine has virtually
no interaction with the millions of businesses whose websites end up
in its organic listings, so the case for knowledge or inducement is
much weaker. Moreover, while trademark uses in paid search listings
are practically per se uses "in commerce"-advertisers make an
affirmative choice to run their sponsored links, and pay for that
privilege-it is not as clear-cut with organic search results. If there is
no underlying infringement, there cannot be secondary liability.
Rather than categorizing OSPs by how they interact with
digital content, a trademark safe harbor should capture the variety of
ways that OSPs interact with trademarks. These interactions include:
171. Id. § 512(c).
172. Photographs and prose are subject to copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
173. E.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
647 (2010).
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(b).
176. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (setting forth




using trademarks to identify products that are available for purchase
at the click of the mouse,178 using trademarks to direct consumers to
products and services in which they presumably have an interest, 179
hosting content that happens to contain trademarks, 180 and using
trademarks as part of an information index.181 A safe harbor could
account for these activities through the following categories: (1)
information location tools, (2) advertising platforms, (3) online
brokers, and (4) passive hosts. These categories should not be
considered mutually exclusive, as OSPs could fit into many or all of
these categories. For instance, search engines are both "information
location tools" and "advertising platforms," for they display
advertisements and provide a searchable database of content. If a
search engine company wanted to earn safe harbor protection from
claims against its organic and sponsored results services, it would
need to comply with both safe harbor provisions.
B. Encouraging Notice-and-Notice
A statute should also address how an OSP should respond to
complaints from markholders. Unlike the DMCA, which encourages
an OSP to promptly remove allegedly infringing content from its
network,182 a trademark statute should facilitate communication
between the markholder and content owner via "notice-and-notice"
procedures. Unlike "notice-and-takedown," which requires OSPs to
remove content immediately upon the request of a rightsholder in
order to receive safe harbor protection, 183 "notice-and-notice" would
only require OSPs to forward the notice of infringement to the alleged
infringer.
Some commentators have proposed that Congress create a
statutory notice-and-takedown scheme, much like the DMCA
procedures for copyright. 184 Proponents of a safe harbor for trademark
believe that such a system would serve the same purposes as the
DMCA: "to preserve strong incentives for service providers and
178. See eBay, 600 F.3d at 112 (using "Tiffany" mark to identify the source of products).
179. See Rosetta Stone Ltd, v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(noting that advertisements on Google contained trademarked terms).
180. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1104 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that some of content hosted by Akanoc was subject to trademark
law).
181. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (noting that Google's "trigger" keyword
index, which linked search queries to relevant advertisements, contained trademarked terms).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
183. Id.
184. See generally Elizabeth K. Levin, Note, A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevaluating
Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491 (2009).
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trademark owners to detect and deal with trademark infringements
that take place on the Internet; to allow ISPs to take clear steps that
will limit their liability; and to encourage the development of the
Internet."85 As further support for the idea that trademark law
would be well served by a DMCA-like statute, safe harbor advocates
point to the fact that OSPs like eBay have already developed
notice-and-takedown systems meant to service both copyright and
trademark complaints. 186
Unlike in copyright, notice-and-takedown is not a desirable
basis for a safe harbor in the context of trademark. First, trademark
infringement is arguably more difficult to spot than copyright
infringement.18 7 While copyright law gives owners a set of exclusive
rights to prohibit nearly all copying (subject to fair use limitations),
trademark law "tolerates a broad range of non-infringing uses."1 88
Whereas a finding of copyright infringement involves a relatively
straightforward showing of "substantial similarity,"18 9 pinpointing
trademark infringement requires assessing a number of factors,
including the distinctiveness of the mark, the similarity of the
markholder's and the user's goods or services, the user's intent, and
whether the use has generated actual confusion. 190 Further, any given
trademark may have multiple legitimate users in different markets or
geographic areas. 191 Such a multifactor analysis does not lend itself
well to a quick determination by an unrelated third party.192
The determination becomes even more complex where a
plaintiff alleges counterfeiting, for OSPs often have no contact with
products ultimately purchased by consumers.193 Even if they had
access to allegedly infringing goods, OSPs are not equipped to assess
185. Id. at 521.
186. Id. at 521-22.
187. Jason Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standard for Contributory Trademark Liability
over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 402-03 (2006).
188. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 965 (C.D. Cal.
1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999); see Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating
copyright holder's rights).
189. See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127,
134-35 (2d Cir. 2003).
190. See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984)
(considering a number of factors: (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark, (2) the
similarity of the two marks, (3) the similarity of the goods or services the marks identify, (4) the
similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses, (5) the similarity of the
advertising used by the two parties, (6) the defendant's intent, and (7) actual confusion (citing
Sun-Fun Prods. v. Suntan Research & Dev., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981))).
191. Kessler, supra note 187, at 403.
192. Id.
193. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir.) (noting that eBay did
not inspect goods before sale), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
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whether a good is genuine or counterfeit. 194 Though a possible
solution could be to require OSPs to rely on the good-faith opinion of
independent "counterfeit experts," 195 such a solution would not
prevent an abusive trademark owner from hiring a biased,
results-oriented "expert" unless the government were to expend
substantial resources in regulating a "counterfeit expert" industry.
Further, scholars have criticized notice-and-takedown in the
copyright context for its lack of transparency and potential for anti-
competitive abuse, 196 concerns that are arguably even weightier in
trademark than in copyright. One study analyzed a database of
DMCA notice-and-takedowns compiled by Chilling Effects, a project
dedicated to protecting First Amendment rights against abusive uses
of intellectual property rights.197  The study reported that a
substantial number of notices were sent from competitor to
competitor, or from big company to blogger-hobbyist.198 It would be
even more troubling if a trademark owner were able to stifle
legitimate competition by sending abusive trademark takedown
notices related to, say, comparative advertising. As discussed earlier,
trademark arguably presents a more difficult case than does copyright
for on-the-fly infringement opinions by OSPs.199 As a result, OSPs will
be even more likely than in copyright to bow to the wishes of abusive
markholders.
Given these concerns, a preferable system for trademark would
be "notice-and-notice," whereby OSPs earn safe harbor protection by
forwarding notice of infringement to the alleged infringer. This would,
in effect, mirror what the web host did in Akanoc.200 Advocates of
copyright reform have asserted that such a framework should
194. Id. ("Even had it been able to inspect the goods, moreover, in many instances it
likely would not have had the expertise to determine whether they were counterfeit.").
195. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that plaintiff had hired private detective experienced in identifying
counterfeit goods).
196. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects'?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 655 (2006); cf. CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.
org (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (providing a searchable database of DMCA cease and desist
notices to promote transparency as to the use of DMCA procedures).
197. Urban & Quilter, supra note 196, at 641-43.
198. Id. at 196, at 655 (noting that, of all notices in the Chilling Effects database, 55
percent were sent from competitor to competitor and 21 percent targeted hobbyists, critics, and
educational users).
199. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
200. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1107 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that web host forwarded plaintiffs complaints onto suspected
infringers).
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supplant the current "notice-and-takedown" system of the DMCA. 201
Canada already employs "notice-and-notice" for copyright takedown
requests and has sought to codify it in two recent bills. 20 2  A
"notice-and-notice" system would reduce the potential for
anti-competitive abuse of trademark rights, for sending a notice would
not produce the instant result of content removal as under a
"notice-and-takedown" system. While avoiding the negative effects of
"notice-and-takedown," "notice-and-notice" would still promote the
ends and means of trademark by enabling markholders to perform
their essential policing function and helping to ensure the reliability of
information on the Internet.
C. Incentivizing Desirable Behaviors
In addition to facilitating communication between complainant
and content owner, a contributory liability statute should contain
provisions incentivizing OSP behaviors that promote the ends and
means of trademark law. These provisions should be tailored to each
of the four OSP categories-information location tools, advertising
platforms, online brokers, and passive hosts-taking into account the
market incentives that drive each type of OSP. As with the OSP
categorizations, these provisions should be drafted broadly enough to
welcome judicial development, yet specifically enough to narrow the
scope of actionable conduct.
Information location tools like search engines inherently serve
trademark's end of reducing consumer search costs by making content
easier to find.20 3 Since their "customers" are, in essence, everyday
consumers searching for content, providers of information location
tools have every incentive to improve the search experience for
consumers rather than catering to the wishes of individual website
owners. 204 The danger of regulating information location tools is
directing their resources away from what they do best: delivering
relevant content to searchers. 205 Therefore, information location tools
201. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 196, at 692 (recommending that the DMCA require
OSPs "to inform their users of any complaints against them, and that users be offered the
opportunity to submit counternotices in advance of any action taken against them").
202. Bill C-61 and the DMCA, CENTRE FOR INNOVATION L. & POL'Y, http://www.
innovationlaw.org/archives/projects/dcr/reform/c61/c61dmca.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
203. See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY
L.J. 507, 593 (2005) ("[Wlhen search providers do their jobs successfully, they can increase the
probability that searchers will find what they were looking for.").
204. Id. at 510 ("Internet search providers compete fiercely with each other to help
Internet searchers find the content they want.").
205. See id. at 595 (noting that trademark law must "ensure some breathing room for
search providers to make .. . editorial judgments and to solve the hard relevancy problem").
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should only have to comply with notice-and-notice in order to earn the
protections of the safe harbor.
Online brokers like eBay help reduce consumer search costs by
providing a large selection of goods at a centralized online location. 206
However, the potential danger with online brokers is the proliferation
of counterfeiting, which undermines trademark's goal of promoting
consistent quality goods and services.207 Since online brokers are
directly accountable to end-purchasers, they certainly have some
market incentives to actively prevent counterfeiting. 208 Indeed, large
online marketplaces like eBay have implemented sophisticated,
multi-million dollar anti-counterfeiting measures. 209 But while the
eBays of the world can afford to spend millions of dollars combating
counterfeiting, this may not be the case for smaller-scale market
participants. Requiring "mom and pop" online brokers to wage a
multi-million dollar war against counterfeiting would likely drive
these retailers out of business, undesirably narrowing consumer
choice. However, brokers who remain entirely insensitive to
counterfeiting should not earn safe harbor protections.
An acceptable balance would be to require online brokers to
help trademark owners help themselves, as opposed to requiring these
OSPs to affirmatively seek out counterfeiting. This might involve, for
instance, a repeat-offender system, whereby an OSP would bar known
counterfeiters from selling, but simply forward notice onto sellers
suspected of counterfeiting for the first time. While legislators would
need to wrestle with a number of issues in determining a safe harbor's
precise terms-for instance, how to determine whether a seller is a
"repeat" infringer, and how to keep track of repeat infringers-a safe
harbor for online brokers should depend to some extent upon taking
action against counterfeiting.
Advertising platforms have great potential to reduce consumer
search costs by connecting consumers with products and services. 210
However, if unchecked, advertising platforms can undermine the trust
206. See generally Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (describing eBay as
"the world's largest online marketplace, where practically anyone can buy and sell practically
anything").
207. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 25:10.
208. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
647 (2010) (opining that eBay has market incentives to reduce infringement).
209. For instance, eBay's Verified Rights Owner program ("VeRO") helps to protect the
rights of intellectual property owners. How eBay Protects Intellectual Property (VeRO), EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
210. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) (noting that advertising reduces consumer search costs by efficiently
communicating useful information to consumers).
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function of trademark by facilitating deceptive advertising. 211
Legislators should be slow to rely on advertising providers, whose
bottom lines depend on maximizing clicks, to advance the goals of
trademark law.2 12  As discussed above, sponsored link providers
employ technical features that make it nearly impossible for
markholders to find infringing advertisements. 2 1 3 While a possibility
would be to condition a safe harbor for advertising providers upon
implementing reasonable pre-screening procedures for determining
whether an advertisement is infringing, these OSPs are not in the
best position to evaluate whether an advertisement is infringing or
not.2 14 Rather, advertising providers should earn the benefit of a safe
harbor by providing a means by which markholders can search the
OSP's entire catalog of advertisements for infringement. For
sponsored link providers, this could be as simple as an "unfiltered"
search box, where markholders could search for any advertisement
containing their trademark, irrespective of geographical or time-of-day
filters. By allowing trademark owners to effectively police their
marks, such a safe harbor condition would promote the means of
trademark.
Although passive hosts sometimes house infringing websites, 215
these OSPs help reduce consumer search costs by allowing content to
be accessible on the Internet. These OSPs should only be subject to
the notice-and-notice provision for several reasons. First, since
passive hosts are generally paid a minimal monthly fee for hosting
services, 216 they are neutral players without bad incentives for
keeping infringing websites online. Further, because setting up a new
hosting account takes only minutes, 217 infringing websites can easily
move from one host to another. Thus, passive hosts should earn safe
211. See supra Part L.A (discussing how trademarks perform "trust" function only if
consumers can reliably associate unobservable product qualities with a mark); cf. Katz, supra
note 12, at 1605-06 (discussing how deceptively misdescriptive marks undermine the trust
function of trademark).
212. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine Advertising
Market: Lucrative Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 223, 239 (2009)
("The revenue incentive is no doubt a factor in Google's advertisement ranking system, which
bases advertisement placement both on the price advertisers are willing to pay per click and also
on other relevance factors such as historic click-through rates.").
213. See supra Part III.C.ii.
214. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 833.
215. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
216. See, e.g., Web Hosting, ICDSOFTr.coM, http://icdsoft.com/hosting.php (last visited
Oct. 18, 2011) (listing hosting plans at six dollars and ten dollars per month).




harbor protections from simply fulfilling the notice-and-notice
requirement.
Considering the foregoing, a statutory safe harbor would
provide the clarity that is absent in the current common law
contributory trademark liability framework and encourage OSP
behaviors that serve the ends and means of trademark.
V. CONCLUsIoN
Contributory trademark infringement liability should serve,
not stifle, the underlying ends and means of trademark. In its current
state, the doctrine threatens to work against trademark law's
consumer-focused goals. Uncertain about potential liability, OSPs
may be overly prone to remove useful, legitimate content from the
Internet. Not having the financial backing necessary to operate in a
space where there are no clear demarcations of liability, would-be
startup OSPs may refrain from developing new technologies that
would benefit the consuming public. And with the free market as
their only regulator, OSPs may not have incentives to operate in a
way that serves trademark's ends and means. A legislative solution
that defines the regulated parties, spells out a notice-and-notice
response system, and provides carefully tailored safe harbors would
provide much-needed clarity to a now murky doctrine, and would
incentivize OSPs to engage in behaviors that serve the ends and
means of trademark law.
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